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PERMANENCE IN POLYMATRIX REPLICATORS
TELMO PEIXE
Abstract. Generally a biological system is said to be permanent
if under small perturbations none of the species goes to extinction.
In 1979 P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, and R. Wol [14] introduced
the concept of permanence as a stability notion for systems that
models the self-organization of biological macromolecules. After,
in 1987 W. Jansen [8], and J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund [5] give
sucient conditions for permanence in the usual replicators. In
this paper we extend these results for polymatrix replicators.
1. Introduction
In the 1970's J. M. Smith and G. R. Price [10] applied the theory of
strategic games developed by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern [17]
in the 1940's to investigate the dynamical processes of biological popu-
lations, giving rise to the feld of the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT).
Some classes of ordinary dierential equations (odes) which plays a
central role in EGT are the Lotka-Volterra systems (LV), the replicator
equation, the bimatrix replicator and the polymatrix replicator.
In 1979 P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, and R. Wol introduced in [14] the
concept of permanence as a stability notion for systems that models
the self-organization of biological macromolecules.
Generally, we say that a biological system is permanent if, for small
perturbations, none of the species goes to extinction.
The Lotka-Volterra systems, independently introduced in 1920s by
A. J. Lotka [9] and V. Volterra [16], are perhaps the most widely known
systems used in scientic areas as diverse as physics, chemistry, biology,
and economy.
Another classical model widely used is the replicator equation which
in some sense J. Hofbauer [4] proved is equivalent to the LV system.
The replicator equation was introduced by P. Taylor and L. Jonker [15].
It models the time evolution of the probability distribution of strate-
gical behaviors within a biological population. Given a payo matrix





, i = 1, . . . , n,
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on the simplex ∆n−1 = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj = 1}.
In the case we want to model the interaction between two popula-
tions (or a population divided in two groups, for example, males and
females), where each group have a dierent set of strategies (asymmet-
ric games), and all interactions involve individuals of dierent groups,
the comon used model is the bimatrix replicator, that rst appeared
in [11] and [13]. Given two payo matrices A ∈ Mn×m(R) and
B ∈ Matm×n(R), for the strategies in each group, the bimatrix replica-
tor refers to the ode{
x′i = xi ((Ay)i − xtAy) i = 1, . . . , n
y′j = yj ((Bx)j − ytB x) j = 1, . . . ,m
on the product of simplices ∆n−1 × ∆m−1. Each state in this case is
a pair of frequency vectors, representing respectively the two groups'
strategic behavioral frequencies. It describes the time evolution of the
strategy usage frequencies in each group.
Suppose now that we want to study a population divided in a nite
number of groups, each of them with nitely many behavioral strate-
gies. Bilateral interactions between individuals of any two groups (in-
cluding the same) are allowed, but competition takes place inside the
groups, i.e., the relative success of each strategy is evaluated within the
corresponding group.
H. Alishah and P. Duarte [1] introduced the model that they desig-
nated as polymatrix games to study this kind of populations. In [2]
H. Alishah, P. Duarte and T. Peixe study particular classes of poly-
matrix games, namely the conservative and dissipative. The system of
odes, designated as the polymatrix replicator, that model this game,
will be presented later in section 3. The phase space of these systems
are prisms, products of simplexes ∆n1−1 × . . .∆np−1, where p is the
number of groups and nj the number of behavioral strategies inside
the j-th group, for j = 1, . . . , p. This class of evolutionary systems
includes both the replicator (the case of only one group of individuals)
and bimatrix replicator models (the case of two groups of individuals).
In 1987 J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund [5] and W. Jansen [8] give
sucient conditions for permanence in the usual replicators. Besides
we introduce the concept of permanece in the polymatrix replicators,
in this paper we also extend these results for polymatrix replicators.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall some
basic properties of the replicator equation, its relation with the LV
systems and the concept of permanence. In section 3 we introduce and
recall the denition of polymatrix replicator. In section 4 we extend
the concept of permanence to polymatrix replicators and the results
given by J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund [5] and W. Jansen [8]. We
also present a result that applies to the special class of dissipative
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polymatrix replicators. Finally, in section 5 we illustrate our main
results of permanence in polymatrix replicators with two examples.
2. Replicator equation and Permanence
In this section we present some elementary denitions and properties
of the replicator equation. For more details on the subject see [6] for
instance.
Consider a population where individuals interact with each other
according to a set of n possible strategies. The state of the popu-
lation concerning this interaction is fully described by a vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn, where xi represents the frequency of individuals us-
ing strategy i, for i = 1, . . . , n. The set of all population states is the
simplex ∆n−1 = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj = 1}.
If an individual using strategy i interacts with an individual using
strategy j, the coecient aij represents the average payo for that
interaction. Let A = (aij) ∈ Mn(Rn) be the matrix consisting of
these aij's. Assuming random encounters between individuals of that












The logarithmic growth rate dxi
dt
/xi of the frequency of strategy i is








, i = 1, . . . , n , (2.1)
dened on the simplex ∆n−1, that is invariant under (2.1).
The replicator equation models the frequency evolution of certain
strategical behaviours within a biological population. In fact, the equa-
tion says that the logarithmic growth of the usage frequency of each
behavioural strategy is directly proportional to how well that strategy
fares within the population.
This system of odes was introduced in 1978 by P. Taylor and L.
Jonker [15] and was designated as replicator equation by P. Schuster
and K. Sigmund [12] in 1983.
In 1981 J. Hofbauer [4] stated an important relation between the LV
systems and the replicator equation. The replicator equation is a cubic
equation on the compact set ∆n−1 while the LV equation is quadratic
on Rn+. However, Hofbauer proved that the replicator equation in n
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variables x1, . . . , xn is equivalent to the LV equation in n− 1 variables
y1, . . . , yn−1 (see also [6]).
Theorem 2.1. There exists a dierentiable invertible map from








, i = 1, . . . , n , (2.2)










, i = 1, . . . , n− 1 , (2.3)
where ri = ain − ann and a′ij = aij − anj .
In LV systems the existence of an equilibrium point in Rn+ is related
with the orbit's behaviour, as we can see by the following proposition
(see [6] or [3], for instance).
Proposition 2.2. System (2.3) admits an interior equilibrium point
i int(Rn+) contains α or ω-limit points.
The following result shows that the time average of the orbits in
LV systems is related to the values that the coordinate functions take
on the equilibrium points. In fact, if there exists a unique interior
equilibrium point and if the solution does not converge to the boundary
neither to innity, then its time average converges to the equilibrium
point.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that x(t) is a solution of (2.3) such that
0 < m ≤ xi(t) ≤ L, for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, there
exists a sequence (Tk)k∈N such that Tk → +∞ and an equilibrium point







x(t) dt = q.







x(t) dt = q.
Proof. A proof of this proposition can be seen in [3]. 
By Proposition 2.2, a LV system admits an ω-limit point in int(Rn+)
if and only if it has an equilibrium point in int(Rn+). Hence, from
Theorem 2.1 we have that
Proposition 2.4. If the replicator (2.1) has no equilibrium point in
int(∆n−1), then every solution converges to the boundary of ∆n−1.
J. Hofbauer in [7] prove also a natural extension of Theorem 2.3 in
LV systems to the replicator equation.
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Theorem 2.5. If the replicator (2.1) admits a unique equilibrium point








x(t) dt = q .
We recall now the concept of permanence in the replicator equation,
that is a stability notion introduced by Schuster et al. in [14].
Denition 2.6. A replicator equation (2.1) dened on ∆n−1 is said to








where ϕt denotes the ow determined by system (2.1).
In the context of biology, a system to be permanent means that
suciently small perturbations cannot lead any species to extinction.
The following theorem due to Jansen [8] is also valid for LV systems.
Theorem 2.7. Let X be the replicator vector eld dened by (2.1).
If there is a point p ∈ int(∆n−1) such that for all boundary equilibria
x ∈ ∂∆n−1,
pT Ax > xT Ax , (2.4)
then the vector eld X is permanent.
This Theorem 2.7 is a corollary of the following theorem which gives
sucient conditions for a system to be permanent. This result is stated
and proved by Hofbauer and Sigmund in [5, Theorem 1] or [6, Theorem
12.2.1].
Theorem 2.8. Let P : ∆n−1 −→ R be a smooth function such that P =
0 on ∂∆n−1 and P > 0 on int(∆n−1). Assume there is a continuous
function Ψ : ∆n−1 −→ R such that
(1) for any orbit x(t) in int(∆n−1), d
dt
logP (x(t)) = Ψ(x(t)) ,
(2) for any orbit x(t) in ∂∆n−1, ∃ T > 0 s. t.
∫ T
0
Ψ(x(t)) dt > 0.
Then the vector eld X is permanent.
3. Polymatrix Replicator
In this section we present the denition of polymatrix replicator. For
more details on the subject, namely some of its properties or special
classes, see [1] and [2].
Consider a population divided in p groups, labelled by an integer
α ranging from 1 to p. Individuals of each group α ∈ {1, . . . , p} have
exactly nα strategies to interact with other members of the population,
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including the same group. The strategies of a group α are labelled by
positive integers i in the range
n1 + . . .+ nα−1 < i ≤ n1 + . . .+ nα .
Hence, all strategies of the population are labelled by the integers i
from 1 to n, where n = n1 + . . .+ np.
We write i ∈ α to mean that i is a strategy of the group α. If
an individual using strategy i ∈ α interacts with an individual using
strategy j ∈ β, for some α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p}, the entry aij represents the
average payo for that interaction. Thus, the payo matrix A = (aij) ∈
Mn(Rn) consisting of these aij's can be decomposed into nα×nβ block
matrices Aα,β, with entries aij, where i ∈ α, j ∈ β, and α and β range
from 1 to p.
Let n = (n1, . . . , np). The state of the population is described by a
point x = (xα)α in the prism
Γn := ∆
n1−1 × . . .×∆np−1 ⊂ Rn ,
where ∆nα−1 = {x ∈ Rnα+ :
nα∑
i=1
xi = 1}, xα = (xj)j∈α and the entry xj
represents the usage frequency of strategy j within the group α. The
prism Γn is a (n−p)-dimensional simple polytope whose ane support
is the (n− p)-dimensional subspace of Rn dened by the p equations∑
i∈α
xi = 1, 1 ≤ α ≤ p .
Assuming random encounters between individuals of that popula-
tion, for each group α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, the average payo for strategy





and the average payo of all strategies in α is given by∑
j∈α
xj (Ax)j ,




The growth rate dxi
dt
/xi of the frequency of strategy i ∈ α, for each
α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, is equal to the payo dierence (Ax)i−
∑
j∈α xj (Ax)j,










, ∀ i ∈ α, 1 ≤ α ≤ p , (3.1)
called the polymatrix replicator.
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Notice that interactions between individuals of any two groups (in-
cluding the same) are allowed. Notice also that this equation implies
that competition takes place inside the groups, i.e., the relative success
of each strategy is evaluated within the corresponding group.
The ow φtn,A of this equation leaves the prism Γn invariant. Hence,
by compactness of Γn, this ow is complete. The underlying vector
eld on Γn will be denoted by XA,n.
In the case p = 1, we have Γn = ∆
n−1 and (3.1) is the usual
replicator equation associated to the payo matrix A.
When p = 2, and A11 = A22 = 0, Γn = ∆
n1−1×∆n2−1 and (3.1) be-
comes the bimatrix replicator equation associated to the pair of payo
matrices (A12, A21).
More generally, it also includes the replicator equation for n-person
games (when Aα,α = 0 for all α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
4. Permanence in the Polymatrix Replicator
In this section we extend to polymatrix replicators the denition
and some properties of permanence stated in the context of LV and
replicator systems.
If an orbit in the interior of the state space converges to the boundary,
this corresponds to extinction. Despite we give a formal denition of
permanence in polymatrix replicators (see Denition 4.2), as we saw in
the context of the LV systems and the replicator equation, we say that
a system is permanent if there exists a compact set K in the interior of
the state space such that all orbits starting in the interior of the state
space end up in K. This means that the boundary of the state space
is a repellor.
Consider a polymatrix replicator (3.1) and X := XA,n its associated
vector eld dened on the d-dimensional prism Γn.
The following result is an extension of the average principle in LV
systems (see Theorem 2.3) and replicator equation (see Theorem 2.5)
to the framework of the polymatrix replicator systems.
Proposition 4.1 (Average Principle). Let x(t) ∈ int (Γn) be an interior
orbit of the vector eld X such that for some ε > 0 and some time
sequence Tk → +∞, as k → +∞, one has















T Ax(t) dt = aα for all α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
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Then q is an equilibrium of X and aα = πα(q)
TAq, for all







x(t)TAx(t) dt = qTAq .







(Ax)i dt = (Aq)i .
By (1) we have for all k, ε < xαi (Tk) < 1− ε. Hence

























It follows that q is an equilibrium of X, and for all i, j ∈ α,

















































TAxdt = (Aq)i − aα ,
which implies that aα = πα(q)







xTAxdt = qTAq .

The denition of permanence in the replicator equation (see De-
nition 2.6) can be naturally extended to the polymatrix replicator, as
follows.
Denition 4.2. Given a vector eld X dened in Γn, we say that
the associated ow ϕtX is permanent if there exists δ > 0 such that
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The following theorem extends Theorem 2.8 for polymatrix replica-
tors.
Theorem 4.3. Let Φ : Γn → R be a smooth function such that
Φ = 0 on ∂Γn and Φ > 0 on int (Γn). Assume there is a continu-
ous function Ψ : Γn → R such that
(1) for any orbit x(t) in int (Γn),
d
dt
log Φ(x(t)) = Ψ(x(t)) ,
(2) for any orbit x(t) in ∂Γn, ∃ T > 0 s. t.
∫ T
0
Ψ(x(t)) dt > 0.
Then the vector eld X is permanent.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 2.8, Sigmund and Hofbauer [6, Theorem
12.2.1] use an argument that is abstract and applicable to a much wider
class of systems, including polymatrix replicator systems. 
Remark 4.4. Sigmund and Hofbauer in [6, Theorem 12.2.2] prove
that for the conclusion in Theorem 4.3 it is enough to check (2) for all
ω-limit orbits in ∂Γn. Thus, dening
(2') for any ω-limit orbit x(t) in ∂Γn,
∫ T
0
Ψ(x(t)) dt > 0 for some
T > 0,
we have that condition (2') implies (2).
The k-dimensional face skeleton of Γn, denoted by ∂kΓn, is the union
of all j-dimensional faces of Γn with j ≤ k. In particular, the edge
skeleton of Γn is the union ∂1Γn of all vertices and edges of Γn.
The following theorem extends Theorem 2.7 to polymatrix replica-
tors.
Theorem 4.5. If there is a point q ∈ int (Γn) such that for all boundary
equilibria x ∈ ∂Γn,
qTAx > xTAx , (4.1)
then X is permanent.
Proof. The proof we present here is essentially an adaptation of the
argument used in the proof of Theorem 13.6.1 in [6].






We can easily see that Φ = 0 on ∂Γn and Φ > 0 on int (Γn).
Consider now the continuous function Ψ : Γn → R,





log Φ(x(t)) = Ψ(x(t)) .
It remains to show that for any orbit x(t) in ∂Γn, there exists a T > 0
such that ∫ T
0
Ψ (x(t)) dt > 0 . (4.2)
We will prove by induction in k ∈ N that if x(t) ∈ ∂kΓn then (4.2)
holds for some T > 0.
If x(t) ∈ ∂0Γn then x(t) ≡ q′ for some vertex q′ of Γn. Since by (4.1)
Ψ(q′) > 0, (4.2) follows. Hence the induction step is true for k = 0.
Assume now that conclusion (4.2) holds for every orbit x(t) ∈ ∂m−1Γn,
and consider an orbit x(t) ∈ ∂mΓn. Then there is an m-dimensional
face σ ∈ Km(Γn) that contains x(t). We consider two cases:
(i) If x(t) converges to ∂σ, i.e., limt→+∞ d (x(t), ∂σ) = 0 then the ω-
limit of x(t), ω(x), is contained in ∂σ. By induction hypothesis, (4.2)
holds for all orbits inside ω(x), and consequently, by Remark 4.4 the
same is true about x(t).
(ii) If x(t) does not converge to ∂σ, there exists ε > 0 and a sequence













for all α = 1, . . . , p. Since the sequences x̄(Tk) and aα(Tk) are bounded,
there is a subsequence of Tk, that we will keep denoting by Tk, such
that x̄(Tk) and aα(Tk) converge, say to q
′ and aα, respectively, for all








converges to qTAq′ − q′TAq′, which by (4.1) is positive. This im-
plies (4.2) and hence proves the permanence of X. 
A particular class of interest in the setting of the polymatrix repli-
cators is the dissipative polymatrix replicator. For formal denitions
and properties on conservative and dissipative polymatrix replicators
see [2]. For this class of systems we have the following remark.
Remark 4.6. If a dissipative polymatrix replicator only has one inte-
rior equilibrium, then it is permanent. In fact, if a dissipative system
only has one interior equilibrium, it follows that the ω-limit of any in-
terior point is that single equilibrium point (see [2, Denition 5.1 and
Proposition 17]). Then permanence follows by denition (see Deni-
tion 4.2).
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5. Example
We present here two examples of polymatrix replicators that are
permanent. We prove that the rst example is permanent because it
satises the condition (4.1) of Theorem 4.5. The second example, we
prove that it is permanent by Remark 4.6, because it is dissipative and
have a unique interior equilibrium. However, it does not satisfy the
condition (4.1) of Theorem 4.5.
There is much more to analyse in the structure/dynamics of these
two examples, but this will be done in future work to appear.
All computations and pictures presented in this section were done
with Wolfram Mathematica and Geogebra software.
5.1. Example 1. Consider a population divided in 4 groups where
individuals of each group have exactly 2 strategies to interact with




1 −1 −1 1 −100 100 −100 100
−1 1 1 −1 100 −100 100 −100
101 −101 −10 10 −1 1 −100 100
−101 101 10 −10 1 −1 100 −100
1 −1 100 −100 −190 190 −101 101
−1 1 −100 100 190 −190 101 −101
1 −1 5 −5 100 −100 −100 100
−1 1 −5 5 −100 100 100 −100

.
The phase space of the associated polymatrix replicator dened by
the payo matrix A is the prism
Γ(2,2,2,2) := ∆
1 ×∆1 ×∆1 ×∆1 ≡ [0, 1]4 .
Besides the 16 vertices of Γ(2,2,2,2) (see Table 1), this system has 2
equilibria on 3d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) (see Table 2), 6 equilibria on 2d-faces
of Γ(2,2,2,2) (see Table 3), and 12 equilibria on 1d-faces (the edges) of
Γ(2,2,2,2) (see Table 4).
All these equilibria belong to ∂Γ(2,2,2,2) and satisfy
(1) (Ax)1 = (Ax)2 , (Ax)3 = (Ax)4 , (Ax)5 = (Ax)6 , (Ax)7 = (Ax)8,
(2) x1 + x2 = 1 , x3 + x4 = 1 , x5 + x6 = 1 , x7 + x8 = 1 ,
where xi is the i
th-component of the corresponding equilibrium x.
We have that all equilibria on ∂Γ(2,2,2,2) satisfy (4.1). In fact, we have
that for all equilibria x ∈ ∂Γ(2,2,2,2),






























Vertices of Γ(2,2,2,2) f(vi)
v1 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) −394
v2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) −4
v3 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) −392
v4 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) −6
v5 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) −602
v6 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) −592
v7 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) −204
v8 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) −198
v9 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) −198
v10 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) −204
v11 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) −592
v12 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) −602
v13 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) −6
v14 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) −392
v15 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) −4
v16 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) −394
Table 1. The vertices of Γ(2,2,2,2) and the value of f(vi), where




















Equilibria on 3d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) f(qi)
q1 =
(







0.9473, 0.05266, 0.0672483, 0.93275, 9049
1028189
, 0.991199, 1, 0
)
−201.7
Table 2. The equilibria on 3d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) and the value of





















as we can see in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4.
Hence, by Theorem 4.5, we can conclude that the system dened by
the payo matrix A is permanent.
5.2. Example 2. Consider a population divided in 3 groups where
individuals of each group have exactly 2 strategies to interact with




0 −102 0 79 0 18
102 0 0 −79 −18 9
0 0 0 0 9 −18
−51 51 0 0 0 0
0 102 −79 0 −18 −9
−102 −51 158 0 9 0
 .
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Equilibria on 2d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) f(qi)
q3 =
(








































































Table 3. The equilibria on 2d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) and the value of





















Equilibria on 1d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) f(qi)
q9 =
(



































































































, 1, 0, 1, 0
)
−488
Table 4. The equilibria on 1d-faces of Γ(2,2,2,2) and the value of





















The phase space of the associated polymatrix replicator dened by
the payo matrix A is the prism
Γ(2,2,2) := ∆
1 ×∆1 ×∆1 ≡ [0, 1]3 .
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Moreover, besides the 8 vertices of Γ(2,2,2),
v1 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) , v2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) ,
v3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) , v4 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) ,
v5 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) , v6 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) ,
v7 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0) , v8 = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) ,
































as represented in Figure 1. In fact, all these equilibria satisfy
(1) (Ax)1 = (Ax)2 , (Ax)3 = (Ax)4 , (Ax)5 = (Ax)6,
(2) x1 + x2 = 1 , x3 + x4 = 1 , x5 + x6 = 1 ,
where xi is the i
th-component of the corresponding equilibrium x.





0 0 0 0 0
0 1
51




0 0 0 1
79
0 0
0 0 0 0 1
9
0
0 0 0 0 0 1
9
 ,
and the ane subspace (as dened in [2])
H(2,2,2) = {x ∈ R6 : x1 = −x2, x3 = −x4, x5 = −x6} .
The quadratic formQAD : H(2,2,2) −→ R dened byQAD (x) = xTADx,
is QAD (x) = −2x23 ≤ 0. Hence, by [2, Denition 5.1], this system is
dissipative.
Since the interior equilibrium is unique, by Remark 4.6, it follows
that the system is permanent. However, this second example does not
satises the condition (4.1) of Theorem 4.5. In fact we have that do





xTAx− qTAx < 0 ,
for all equilibria x ∈ ∂Γ(2,2,2).
We give now a brief description of the dynamics of this example, as
illustrated by the plot of three orbits in Figure 1. This system has a
strict global Lyapunov function h : int(Γ(2,2,2))→ R for XA, dened by
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Figure 1. Two dierent perspectives of the polytope Γ(2,2,2)
where the polymatrix replicator given by the payo matrix A is
dened. Namelly, the plot of its equilibria and three interior orbits.
where XA is the associated vector eld, qi is the i
th-component of the
equilibrium q, and di is the entry (i, i) of matrix D. In fact this func-
tion h has an absolute minimum at q and satisfy ḣ = Dhx(XA) < 0 for
all x ∈ int(Γ(2,2,2)) with x 6= q. Hence, by Proposition 13 and Propo-
sition 17 in [2], the ω-limit of any interior point x ∈ int(Γ(2,2,2)) is the
equilibrium q. The equilibria q1 and q2 in faces of Γ(2,2,2) are centres
in each corresponding face, i.e., for any initial condition in one of these
faces the corresponding orbit will be periodic around the equilibrium
point in that same face.
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